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There has been relatively little written applying the insights of legal realism to
international law, particularly international economic law. Professor Gregory Shaffer has
admirably filled this gap in his excellent new book, Defending Interests: Public-Private
Partnerships in WTO Litigation.1

I.

Legal Realism in International Economic Law
There are two reasons, one theoretical and one practical, which account for the failure of

legal realism to have much to say about international economic law. Legal realism came of age
in the 1920s and early 1930s, first at Columbia Law School and then at Yale Law School.2 One
branch of the realist project was skeptical that either rules or facts constrained courts or legal
decisionmakers and sought to document the indeterminacy of law.3 Other realists sought to apply
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the insights of social science to legal rulemaking and dispute resolution.4
By the time that the principal international economic institutions such as the GATT,
World Bank and the IMF were created after World War II, legal realism was somewhat
discredited, its adherents either recanting or moving on to other endeavors, and the movement
had lost most of its grip on the American legal imagination. The legal process movement was in
ascendancy with its emphasis on using reasoned elaboration and neutral principles to define the
legitimacy of United States court opinions and administrative decisions.5
After World War II, international law as a discipline was also under attack in a way that
cut against a strong contribution from the remaining realists. The political realists, led by Hans
Morgenthau, asserted that international law did not constrain nations’ behavior and that only self
interest and power governed relations between sovereign states at the international level.6 While
many in the extreme wing of the legal realist movement would probably agree with that
statement, most of the mainstream international law world instead defended international law as
an autonomous discipline. This strategy had the effect of further marginalizing the legal realist
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approach. Even the neo-realism of Myres McDougal and the so-called New Haven school had
little impact on the central struggle between the international law and the international relations
community in the post-War era.7 By the time that international economic law became its own
discipline in the 1970s and 1980s,8 legal realism was legal history.
The other impediment was more practical in nature. The law in action in the WTO, or in
most international economic institutions, is simply not very transparent. Many disputes never
reach a final public published decision. This is particularly true in the WTO where the members
are obligated to consult and attempt to resolve their differences prior to instituting a dispute
resolution proceeding.9 Even if a dispute resolution proceeding is initiated, it may be resolved
long before a published panel or appellate decision, frequently on the basis of political or legal
criteria far removed from the specific trade issue at stake in the dispute. Even a published
decision may be the basis for post-decision bargaining as to relief or the merits of the dispute. To
unravel the broad patterns of the legal, political, and strategic behavior underlying this process
requires both access to the key decisionmakers and taking what they say with a grain of salt.
Shaffer is well positioned to bring the insights of legal realism to bear on dispute
settlement in the WTO. He is a well-regarded international economic law professor at the
University of the Wisconsin, which is one of the centers of the law and society movement, and
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thus an heir to the realist legacy.10 He also has an impressive record of past scholarship in
international economic law.11 Most importantly, he has embarked on a lengthy empirical project
of interviews with US, EC, LDC trade officials, private sector trade specialists, and WTO staff to
closely examine whether the law in action at the WTO matches the formal legal rules of the
WTO dispute resolution. In keeping with the realist tradition, Shaffer is also interested in
ascertaining the winners and the losers resulting from the operation of the seemingly neutral legal
rules.

II.

Hybrid Dispute Settlement at the WTO
Shaffer’s critical insight is that most WTO disputes involve a type of ad hoc hybrid

public-private partnerships that come together in particular disputes. For Shaffer: “The growing
interaction between private enterprises, their lawyers, and U.S. and European officials in the
bringing most trade claims reflects a trend from predominately intergovernmental decisionmaking toward multilevel private litigation strategies involving direct public-private exchange at
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the national and international levels.”12 This phenomenon largely gets ignored in the current
literature because international relations specialists tend to focus on the interactions between
nation states and international organizations, economists tend to focus on market transactions
between private actors, and lawyers tend to focus on the formal rules, institutions, and dispute
resolution processes at work. Each thus sees only the tip of its iceberg of how trade disputes get
resolved and not the hybrid nature of the emerging process.
In many ways Shaffer’s approach is closest to a version of political choice theory which
seeks to analyze markets for political decision making.13 As Shaffer notes: “Governments need
informational resources that private actors provide.”14 Even the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), which represents the U.S. in the WTO, cannot develop on its own the
massive information needed for a successful WTO challenge to an alleged foreign trade barrier
without the assistance of the affected industry. At the same time, governments have something
that private actors lack, which is the exclusive standing to bring trade disputes within the WTO
dispute settlement process. These public-private networks and partnerships evolve most often in
trade disputes because fewer domestic actors have countervailing interests and the foreign
constituencies protected by the trade barriers being challenged have no political representation in
the country initiating the WTO complaint.15
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Once he establishes his theoretical framework, Shaffer applies it first to the United States
and then the European Union. For the United States, his principal focus is on Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 “as a mechanism within a broader informal process of public-private
coordination behind U.S. challenges to foreign trade barriers.”16
Shaffer’s examination of the use of Section 301 and the formulation of U.S. trade cases
before the WTO is a sophisticated one. It does not fall prey to the notion that private interests
simply dictate trade policy or use their governments as tools of private interest. The USTR has
multiple trade disputes going on at the same time, some of which as petitioner, some of which as
respondent, and a host of other governmental interests to represent. If the USTR needs the
information and other resources that the private sector can offer, the private sector is equally
dependent on the government to select and prioritize its issues over the many others on the
government’s agenda. Only when those two sets of interests are aligned do cases get raised in
the WTO rather than shunted to the side through the various modes of discretion embodied in
Section 301.17
Shaffer then illustrates how trade associations in the United States are critical to a
successful public-private collaboration to challenge foreign trade barriers. They become the
focal point for the intense coordination, exchange of information between public authorities and
private firms, strategic use of leverage points against foreign governments, and harnessing of
political clout needed for this process. The author uses examples from the Kodak-Fuji, EC Beef
Hormones, intellectual property, Foreign Sales Corporation, and numerous other trade disputes to
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show how neither the government nor the private sector dictate policy to the other, but instead
create fluid and shifting ad hoc partnerships to bring and defend US trade policy.18
He then turns to the more nascent public-private partnerships used by the European Union
in this area. In contrast to the bottom up approach prevalent in the United States, the EC
historically has formulated its trade policy from a more hierarchical top-down perspective with
little direct input from the private sector. However, Shaffer sees the development of similar
public-private partnerships for EC trade policy, but with a distinctive European flavor based on
the complicated dynamic between the member states and the Eureopan Commission in the
conduct of EC foreign affairs and trade policy. He notes:
EC public-private partnerships operate quite differently from those in the United
States. The EC’s more convoluted policymaking process and more fragmented
market slow the development of EC public-private trade networks. Directly or
indirectly, the European Commission seeks approval of its trade policy initiatives
by the EC’s fifteen member states,19 often by consensus. Individual member
states can impede the Commission’s endeavors. Moreover, many European firms
remain predominately nation-based, even though European market integration has
progressed significantly. European firms traditionally have had fewer contacts
with the Commission in Brussels than U.S. firms have with officials in
Washington. At times, the Commission has proactively sought contact with
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private firms, lobbying firms to lobby it.20
The more aggressive U.S. market access strategy is attributed to the “more aggressive role of
U.S. private interests in trade policy.” The differences between the US and the EC which
produce these differences are attributed to four categories: political structures, businessgovernment relations, use of lawyers and adversarial litigation, and administrative culture.21
Shaffer also examines the handful of cases where the US and EC cooperate in cases against trade
barriers in third countries, but concludes that the structural and behavioral differences outlined
above will make anything other than occasional collaboration all but impossible.22
Defending Interests concludes with a look at the social, political and legal implications of
these developments. Perhaps the most important of these conclusions is that : “[T]he extensive
resources deployed by public-private networks in the United States and Europe in WTO litigation
exacerbates power asymmetries in the use of the WTO legal system to the detriment of
developing countries and their constituents. The WTO legal system has become increasingly
costly, favoring legally astute U.S. and EC public-private networks with ample resources.”23
The growth and success of public-private partnerships thus has important ramifications
for the other players in the WTO dispute resolution system, particularly lesser developed
countries (LDCs) which is the subject of ongoing work by Shaffer. The United States is a party
or third party in the new DSU system 97% of the time, the EU 81% of the time. Most LDCs do
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not participate at all. However, LDCs participate more than before and their success rate is up in
comparison to the prior GATT consensus-based system. The fact remains that in most cases
brought by LDCs, the respondents are LDCs as well. Where the defendant is the US or EC, the
LDCs are more often than not, bringing a “me too” type case, tagging along on the work and the
complaint brought by one of the developed countries. Under the new system, when the petitioner
is the US or the EC, an LDC is five times more likely to be the respondent then before. The
success rate for LDCs is highly skewed by the increasing use of the WTO DSU by large LDCs
such as India and Brazil.24
There are only a limited number of strategies that LDCs can utilize to counter the publicprivate partnerships that now drive the DSU process. The most effective appears to be forming
the same kind of public-private partnerships used by the US and the EC. There will be
opportunities where multinationals are harmed by the operation of unlawful trade barriers, by
even their so-called “home” jurisdiction, and can work with LDCs for their mutual benefit.
Larger LDCs may have a sufficiently developed private sector to create indigenous public-private
partnerships of their own on particular issues. There may also be opportunities for LDCs to
partner with each other to pool resources and expertise. Technical assistance from the WTO and
the private sector may also help allow LDCs to come to the table more often as petitioners and
defend themselves more effectively as respondents. But Shaffer is clear that these are the special
cases and not the norm, and that the hybrid nature of dispute resolution in the WTO primarily
serves to allow the US and EC to settle disputes among themselves or attack the barriers to trade,
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investment, and services maintained by LDCs in contravention of the rules of the WTO.

III.

Legal Realism and the Future for International Economic Law Scholarship
Shaffer’s book bodes well for the future of scholarship in this area. It is lucid, to the

point, and illuminates much of what was previously little more than Washington insider gossip
about how things actually worked in Geneva.25 It does not fall prey to either a pollyannaish view
that the WTO is a panacea for the world’s ills or a conspiratorial take on a New World Order
between corporations and elites. It is instead a first rate example of what modern realist
scholarship can offer.
There is some evidence that this approach is spreading within the international economic
law community.26 The notion of public-private hybrid networks is a powerful one that can and is
being applied in a variety of international economic law settings beyond just WTO dispute
resolution. The very notion that law is being produced through a hybrid process is itself a
welcome continuation of the legal realist project in showing the false distinction betwene public
and private power in law. But there are so many areas of international economic law (and indeed
law generally) where the rule/fact skepticism of the realists and the devotion to social science to
show us the law in action versus the law on the books can illuminate the present and better shape
the future. We can only hope that more will pick up the challenge presented by Shaffer and bring
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to fruition the long deferred promise of a legal realist perspective on the issues of international
economic law.
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